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AN APPRAISAL OF FINANCIAL PENALTIES UNDER 
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS IN THE UK
Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPA) are gradually 
becoming an established alternative that corporate offenders 
in the UK are turning to. The concept which encourages 
corporate offenders to self-report and pay the cost of the 
criminal acts allegedly committed, while affording them 
the opportunity to rectify their internal malfeasance have, 
since its introduction in 2014, recorded large scale financial 
penalties against corporate offenders. This Update argues that 
although the financial penalties agreed and arrived at by the 
courts appear to be effective, the computational methodology 
employed in arriving at the financial penalties gives room  
for inconsistency.
INTRODUCTION 
nFinancial penalties are at the heart of the deferred prosecution framework. They play an important role in reflecting the severity 
of the offences allegedly committed by corporate offenders.
So far, only nine corporations have been subject to the DPA 
mechanism by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in resolving their 
alleged criminal conduct. This has brought to light some of the 
requirements that should be present in a DPA (financial penalty, 
compensation, disgorgement of profit, compliance measures, 
cooperation with relevant authorities, cost to the Prosecuting 
Authority among others). Of particular interest is the level of discounts 
applied by the courts.
In reviewing the financial penalties that have been handed down 
so far under DPAs agreed with the SFO, this Update examines the 
factors taken into account by the court to adjust the financial penalties 
and the circumstances when the court will apply discounts. Discounts 
are applied by the court to ensure that the penalties arrived at are fair, 
reasonable and proportionate to the offences allegedly committed 
on the one hand, while also ensuring that the penalty serves as a 
deterrence to prospective offenders on the other.
COMPUTATIONAL METHODOLOGY 
The parameters to guide the court in the assessment of the financial 
penalties are wide. This is in order to ensure that the court achieves 
a penalty that is comparable to what would have been imposed if a 
conviction was to be entered following a guilty plea. In achieving that 
comparability benchmark, the cumulative provisions of para 5(3)(a) 
of Sch 17 of the 2013 Act; para 8.1 (iii), 8.3 and 8.4 of the DPA Code 
of Practice envisage that reference is made to the relevant Sentencing 
Council Guidelines. These guide the court in the computation and 
assessment of the financial penalties that will be imposed on the 
corporation. 
In all the DPAs that have been conducted to date, the courts 
have made recourse to the Sentencing guidelines for Corporate 
Offenders: Fraud, Bribery and Money Laundering (Guidelines) in 
the assessment of the financial penalty. The starting point according 
to the Guidelines is to determine the severity of the offence.  
In computing this, the court considers the culpability of the 
corporate offender and the harm figure. Taking culpability, the 
guidelines group the multiplier effect based on the seriousness of the 
offence into high, medium and low culpability. 
In using the appropriate culpability category, a starting point for 
the multiplier to the harm figure can be derived. That multiplier for 
the appropriate category range is then adjusted for aggravating and 
mitigating factors (by reference to a non- exhaustive list set out in 
the Guidelines). This allows for the assessment of a final multiplier. 
The Guidelines recognise that the culpability might be such that it is 
appropriate to move outside the category range altogether. 
However, irrespective of the multiplier effect on the harm  
figure, the court takes into account the ability of the offender to pay. 
The DPA entered between the SFO and Guralp Systems Limited 
(SFO v Guralp Systems Limited (U20190840)), which was  
sanctioned by the court where no financial penalty was awarded,  
is a quintessential example of this.
A similar situation played out in SFO v Sarclad Limited 
(U20150856). Here the court in its assessment of the penalty, reduced 
the penalty it initially arrived at from £8.2m to £352,000.00 noting 
that Sarclad Limited would be unable to pay the sum arrived at because 
the sum would tip it into insolvency. Conversely a recent DPA entered 
between SFO and Arline Services Limited (SFO v Arline Services 
Limited (ASL) U20201913)) established that ASL had the capacity to 
pay for the financial penalty arrived at based on the backing of one of 
its largest shareholders. 
The discretionary latitude enjoyed by the court in the measurement 
of financial penalties must be exercised in such a way that the penalty 
arrived at is comparable to what would have been imposed if there 
was a conviction. Flowing from this, another criterion the court 
has implicitly formulated in assessing the effectiveness of financial 
penalties is what can be described as the “extraterritorial test”. This test 
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is distilled from the court’s analysis of the financial penalties imposed 
in Standard Bank (ICBC) Plc. The question that this test seeks to pose, 
where the wrongdoing took place outside the UK, is whether the 
penalty is comparable to that which would have been imposed if the 
matter were dealt with in another jurisdiction.
In SFO v Standard Bank ICBC (U201508254), Standard Bank Plc 
was alleged to have failed to prevent Stanbic Bank Tanzania Limited 
(its sister company) from committing bribery contrary to s 7 Bribery 
Act 2010. The circumstances of the case were such that there were 
possible violations of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 15 USC. 
The court in imposing the financial penalty of US$16.8m asked itself 
whether the penalty was comparable to one that would have been 
imposed if the matter were handled in the US, using R v Innospec Ltd 
as a guide. The court resolved this in the affirmative and its decision 
was further confirmed by the US Department of Justice to be fair, 
reasonable and proportionate.
The assessment of the quantum of the penalty using the final 
multiplier, taking into account the corporate offender’s capacity 
to pay, reflects the UK’s commitment to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention which seeks to punish bribery offences with effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties. Putting the 
financial penalty on an extra-territorial scale gives it an equivalence 
to what would be imposed in another jurisdiction. Furthermore, the 
approach disrupts practices engaged by corporations who are in the 
habit of “fishing” for jurisdictions to set up a presence where lighter 
penalties are imposed on corporate financial crimes. Corporates  
must now think twice before committing any wrongdoing in the  
UK, knowing that a comparative approach will be adopted to arrive 
at a penalty that reflects the severity of the offence beyond the  
UK jurisdiction. 
The DPA mechanism in the UK has recorded some successes 
given the high financial penalties that have been imposed on 
companies so far. In SFO v Tesco Stores Ltd, the court approved a 
financial penalty of £128,992.50 on Tesco Plc for the overstatement of 
its financial position as a result of the alleged acts of false accounting, 
contrary to s 17 Theft Act 1968. 
However, there is concern as to how the court arrived at the 
financial penalty using the Guidelines specifically for the offence 
of false accounting. Although the Guidelines specify that they are 
applicable to computing financial penalties for the offence of false 
accounting, they do not make provision for how the court will 
determine the harm figure, which is usually the starting point in 
computing a financial penalty. In SFO v Tesco Stores Ltd this lacuna 
created a difficulty and affected the approach taken by the court to 
arrive at a penalty sufficiently effective to reflect the severity of the 
alleged offence. 
Where there was insufficient evidence of the amount by which the 
corporate benefitted from the false accounting, the court resorted to 
an approach under the Guidelines which provides that 10-20% of the 
relevant revenue may be an appropriate measure in determining the 
harm figure. With this formula the court arrived at a financial penalty 
of £128,992.50. 
Interestingly, similar difficulties did not surface in a subsequent 
DPA between the SFO and Serco Geografix Limited (SFO v Serco 
Geografix Limited (U20190413)) which involved a combination  
of false accounting and fraud charges because the court could  
easily determine the harm figure based on the facts and 
circumstances of the case. However, the resurgence of similar 
circumstances as occurred in the Tesco case cannot be ruled  
out in subsequent DPAs, especially as false accounting appears  
to be a fairly standard offence.
These concerns align with submissions of the UK Law Society 
in its assessment of the Guidelines for the computation of financial 
penalties under the DPA scheme. It is recommended that in order 
to ensure consistency and certainty in the approach adopted by the 
court, there should be two types of guidelines – one overarching 
guideline which sets out the principles of a DPA, and more 
importantly, an offence-specific guideline which sets out the starting 
point or range for financial penalties and other conditions.
As noted earlier, the courts are careful to arrive at financial 
penalties that reflect the severity of the offence committed. This 
was clear in SFO v Rolls-Royce Plc & Anor (U20170036). Here, the 
amount of the financial penalty imposed was as a result of the gravity 
of the offence allegedly committed by the engineering magnate across 
multiple jurisdictions and the monies involved. The offences covered 
conspiracy to corrupt, failure to prevent bribery and false accounting. 
The court in computing the financial penalty after the application of 
discounts arrived at a sum of £239,082,645m. 
However, given the hefty amounts of financial penalties imposed 
on companies so far, there is a growing argument that it would be 
better to go through the rigours of a criminal trial despite the interim 
reputational damage it could cause and allow the prosecution to 
establish the corporate’s wrongdoing beyond reasonable doubt.  
This would give the company the chance of retaining the funds that 
would have been spent on the payment of DPA financial orders.  
This argument gained traction following Tesco’s DPA where the 
three employees alleged to have been involved in fraud and false 
account reporting were all acquitted by the court for lack of evidence. 
Similar issues also played out in the Rolls Royce case where despite 
the court’s observation that the case to approve the DPA involved 
large scale bribery and corruption, one that even implicated top 
senior management, the SFO stated that there was either insufficient 
evidence of wrongdoing or that it was not in the interest of the 
taxpayer to prosecute the company.
The prosecuting agencies are required to pass an evidential test 
under the DPA Code of Practice (and a public interest test) that 
then gives the court the impetus to consider and approve the DPA 
financial orders agreed between the prosecuting agency and the 
corporation. In reliance on the Code of Practice the court assumes 
that the penalties are justifiable and anchored on admissible 
evidence. It is therefore essential that the prosecuting agencies under 
the DPA scheme acquire credible and admissible evidence, not 
just for the purpose of meeting the evidential test under the DPA 
but also in order to secure a conviction against those individuals 
















involved in the alleged acts. This is crucial so that a company paying 
a DPA financial order is at least confident that the payments made 
are justifiable and are as a result of the offences allegedly committed, 
based on the evidence. 
In addition, since the courts play a pivotal role under the DPA 
scheme, they should also ensure proper evaluation of the evidence 
produced by the prosecuting authorities before giving their approval. 
ADJUSTING FINANCIAL PENALTIES AND THE CONCEPT 
OF DISCOUNTS ON FINANCIAL PENALTIES UNDER A DPA
The Guidelines give the court power to make further adjustments to 
the financial penalties. 
They set out a number of factors that should be taken into account 
such as: 
	 where the company in question can show substantial financial 
hardship; 
	 whether the penalty impairs the ability of the company to make 
restitution to its victims; 
	 the impact of the penalty on employees of the company and its 
customers; 
	 whether the penalty affects the ability of the company to 
implement its compliance programme, amongst others. 
Discounts
The Code of Practice also empowers the court to take into account 
discounts measured against what would be afforded if there was a 
guilty plea. The courts are guided by s 144 Criminal Justice Act and 
the Guidelines issued by the Council on Guilty pleas to ensure that the 
penalty arrived at by the prosecutors and the court is fair, reasonable 
and proportionate. The idea behind the concept of discounts under the 
DPA scheme is to incentivise openness, co-operation and voluntary 
disclosure of wrongdoing by the corporation. 
It is important to state that the discounts applied should be 
equivalent to what would have been afforded if there was an “early 
guilty plea”. 
Records from concluded DPAs have shown that factors such as 
the extent of the corporation’s admission, the level of assistance and 
co-operation offered to the prosecuting agencies and the extent of 
compliance are taken into account by the court. 
Given the level of co-operation in DPAs concluded so far, it is 
worthy of note that all the companies that have embraced the DPA 
have had discounts applied to the financial penalty imposed on them. 
CONCLUSION
This update has highlighted the level of discretion afforded to courts 
when setting financial penalties under DPA schemes. The argument 
remains that companies may be better off going through the rigours 
of a criminal trial to avoid paying out hefty financial penalties only 
for employees to be later acquitted. n
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